INTRODUCTION THE VALUATION OF ASSETS is a long-standing problem in economics. Is there
any rational foundation for actual prices of gold, stocks, land, or money itself? To answer this question finance theory generally assumes that the price of an asset equals the (expected) present discounted value of its dividends, i.e., its market fundamental. This view has, for example, been taken to test the causes of fluctuations of stock prices (see Leroy and Porter [25] and Shiller [32, 33] ).
In a previous paper (Tirole [35] ) 1 considered an economy with a finite number of infinitely lived traders and I showed that any asset must indeed be valued according to its market fundamental. This conclusion is robust to differential information and to the presence of short sales constraints. This paper investigates whether the fundamentalist view of asset pricing extends to overlapping generations economies. As stated this question can readily be answered in the negative. Since Samuelson [30] developed his consumption loan model it has been well known that there exist economies in which money has a positive value in spite of the fact that it is intrinsically useless (i.e., its market fundamental is zero). In other words there can exist a bubble on money where a bubble is defined as the difference between the market price and the market fundamental.2 However models in which money is the only store of value are peculiar. And it is sometimes conjectured that if traders hold a real asset there can not be price bubbles. The idea roughly runs as follows: If the long-run interest rate is nonpositive and if there exists a rent, i.e., an asset that distributes real dividends in each period, the market fundamental of this asset is infinite, so that this asset cannot be transferred between generations. On the other hand if the long-run interest rate is positive, the asset bubble-which must grow at the interest rate-eventually becomes so big that young generations cannot buy the asset. This loose reasoning has been made rigorous by Scheinkman [31] . As we will market fundamental of the corresponding assets from being exhausted. In both cases the market selection of "bubbly" assets may not be efficient. Section 8 shows that the financial definition of market fundamental and bubble, which is adopted throughout the paper, is not always satisfactory. More subtle distinctions may be required for some assets.
Lastly Sections 9 and 10 conclude with some brief thoughts about what creates a bubble and about the use of the overlapping generations model to formalize asset pricing.
For conciseness the proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 7 are given in the Appendix. The other (omitted) proofs can be found in Tirole [35] . PART 
1: EXISTENCE AND CHARACTERIZATION OF BUBBLES

THE BASIC MODEL
The model is based on Diamond's classic contribution. I refer the reader to the original paper for more details.
(a) Consumers: A consumer lives for two periods, but works only during the first. He supplies one unit of labor inelastically. Thus the labor force at time t, L, equals the number of young consumers at this date. We shall assume that the population grows at rate n > 0. Thus There is only one physical good per period. 4 The arguments of the consumer's unchanging utility function are his consumptions when young and old: u(cl, co). We will assume that both goods are normal and that the curvature of the utility function is bounded above and bounded away from zero. For the moment the unique income of a consumer born at t is his wage w,. Let r,+? denote the (real) interest rate at time (t+1). Aggregate savings at time t can be written: (1 + n)ts(wt, r,+1) where s is the individual savings function.
(b) Production: There exists an unchanging twice continuously differentiable constant returns to scale technology: ( 
2) Yt = F(K,, L,)= L,f(k,)
where Y, is total output, K, is the capital stock, and k, is the capital stock per worker. Capital must be invested one period in advance. We will assume that f(O) = 0; f'(0) = +oo; that marginal rates of substitution are decreasing; and that production using this technology is competitive. Then JEAN TIROLE As is well known our assumptions imply the existence of a downward sloping factor price frontier: ( 
4) wt = O(rt).
Lastly capital at date zero (ko> 0), and thus date-zero interest rate and wage, are given by history: (5) ro = f'(ko).
(c) Equilibrium: Given r,,1, firms invest at time t so as to equalize the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate (equation (3) We also make Diamond's stability assumption that the curves defined by {w = P(r)} and {r = 41(w, O)} have a unique intersection and that the 4' curve is strictly steeper (in absolute value) than the ' curve at this intersection in the (r, w) plane.5 Let F be defined by ( 
8) F = I(P(Mr), 0).
In the case where Vtat=O, Diamond has shown that there exists a unique competitive equilibrium. In this equilibrium the interest rate converges to F. The equilibrium path is efficient if F> n and inefficient if F< n. 6 The interest rate F will play a crucial role in what follows. We now extend Diamond's model to include rents and bubbles.
First there exist assets that bring a real rent (dividend), such as a natural resource, land, paintings, and jewels (for their consumption value) or decreasing returns to scale technologies.7 For simplicity we assume that the total rent in the economy is R units of real good per period. The market fundamental of the corresponding assets is for a sequence of real interest rates: -Much of the analysis (but not all) can be carried out without this assumption; it then becomes lengthier. 6 We do not consider the nongeneric case r = n for simplicity. This case requires the use of Cass's [11] efficiency criterion.
7As is well known the case of decreasing returns to scale production functions can be transformed into the constant returns case by defining appropriately "entrepreneurial ability" for each firm. This transformation amounts to introducing one input per decreasing returns to scale firm and interpreting the price of this input as the rent on the firm. Second consumers can invest in assets with a zero market fundamental. These assets are best thought of as pieces of paper, whatever their origin, and are called bubbles. In reality some of these "useless" pieces of paper are likely to pertain to the ownership of rents (in addition to their market fundamental) or to that of some firms producing with a constant returns to scale technology that is freely available. The first term on the right-hand side converges to the market fundamental (if it exists), and the second term is always nonnegative. Therefore the asset's price must exceed its market fundamental. (c) If F < 0, there exists no bubbleless equilibrium. There exists a unique bubbly equilibrium. It is asymptotically bubbly and the interest rate converges to n. Proposition 1, which is proved in the Appendix, states that the existence of bubbles is conditioned by the efficiency of the bubbleless equilibrium. Note that when the economy is asymptotically bubbleless, the total bubble B, -(1 + n)Yb, grows indefinitely (as F > 0). However it becomes small relative to the economy.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is simple indeed. Bubbles lower productive savings and thus increase the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate. When the bubbleless and rentless economy is efficient, the interest rate in the same economy with bubbles and rents a fortiori must in the long run exceed the rate of population growth. But since the bubble B, must grow at the rate of interest, it ends up growing faster than the resources of the economy. Thus bubbles are ruled out by wealth constraints, comforting the intuition given in the introduction. This intuition, however, turns out to be misleading when the economy in the long run can grow at a rate exceeding the interest rate, i.e., in the inefficient case.
Let us give a rough intuition for the proposition when there are no rents in the economy. The dynamic system can then be simply described by two difference 9 In Proposition 3, we do not consider the nongeneric cases F = 0 and F = n for brevity. To give an heuristic description of the behavior of this system, let us look at the corresponding phase diagram10 (the continuous time representation offers only a convenient description of the properties found in Appendix 1; it is not meant to be a substitute for the discrete time analysis). The constant-capital-percapita locus ("kt+1 = k,") slopes negatively at the Diamond bubbleless steady state from our stability assumption. From (16'), (16") and the assumption that savings increase with income, the constant-bubble-per-capita locus ('b,+1 = bt") always slopes up. Figure 1 , which is drawn for the inefficient case (k > k), depicts a few rational expectations paths (for a given path, only a countable number of points on this path will actually be observed because of the discrete time nature of our model).
The asymptotically bubbly path of Proposition 1 is the saddle path converging to the golden rule steady state in Figure 1 . Along this path, the per capita levels ' Let us reintroduce rents. We cannot employ the phase diagram any more (even with the usual caveat about its use to depict the evolution of a discrete time system). On the one hand the difference equation governing the evolution of nonproductive savings (the generalization of (16')) is not autonomous any longer; see equation (11) . On the other hand monotonic convergence to the steady state is not guaranteed. However, much of the previous intuition carries over. Indeed if the long-run rate of interest is strictly positive, the per capita value of rents becomes negligible and the dynamics then resemble those in Figure 1 .
The long-run rate of interest in the bubbleless and rentless economy can be negative if capital depreciates. The interaction between rents and bubbles then becomes important, as shown by part (c) of the proposition. First there exists no bubbleless equilibrium. The intuition behind this fact roughly runs as follows:
If the market fundamental of rents per capita ft converges to zero, in the long run almost all the savings are used for capital accumulation. Thus the economy behaves asymptotically like the Diamond rentless and bubbleless economy and the interest rate converges to r < 0. But then the market fundamental of rents is infinite, a contradiction. Suppose now that f, does not converge to zero. From (11) we know that this requires the interest rate to be relatively high in the long run (close to n). But then Ft is bounded and ft converges to zero, a contradiction. Introducing bubbles, the same type of reasoning shows that there cannot be any asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium either. The only possible equilibrium is the asymptotically bubbly one. Thus if F <0, bubbles are necessary for the existence of an equilibrium in an economy in which there exists an (arbitrarily small) rent. Under the condition that they do not become small relative to the economy they allow the interest rate to remain positive and bounded away from 0 in the long run and thus the market fundamental of rents to be well-defined.
Wallace [38] found that monetary equilibria (in which money is a pure bubble) exist if and only if the rate of population growth exceeds the coefficient of proportionality in the storage technology. Proposition 1 extends Wallace's analysis to the existence of rents (which, as shown by Scheinkman and the discussion above, may matter for the existence of bubbles). Furthermore its use of a production technology rather than a storage technology has some advantages. It allows one to analyze the capital adjustment path and the influence of the bubble on interest rates and market fundamental of rents.'2 And consumers always ' These two properties result from Lemmas 11 and 12 in the Appendix. 12 The idea underlying the inverse relationship between the market fundamental f0 and the bubble bo is the following: A high initial bubble leads to high interest rates. Thus the rents are discounted highly and their market fundamental is small. This argument, however, is not quite complete since a low market fundamental leads to high productive savings and thus to low interest rates. Proposition 1 shows that this latter effect is more than offset by the former.
hold several assets whereas in the equilibrium Wallace focuses on, which corresponds to the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium, consumers hold only one asset. 13 We now briefly turn to the question of efficiency. An allocation is efficient if and only if it is not possible to improve the welfare of all generations (and this strictly for at least one of them). Proposition 2 states that, in the Diamond inefficient case, only the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium is efficient. PROPOSITION 2: If F < n, then the asymptotically bubbleless equilibria are inefficient and the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium is efficient.
The reader may rightly not feel satisfied with our formulation of rents. We have assumed that the total rent in the economy R remains constant over time, so that its value per capita becomes negligible if the long run rate of interest is strictly positive. This assumption, which was made to simplify the analysis, gives rise to the following objection: Imagine that rents per period grow at the rate of population growth, i.e., at the asymptotic rate of growth. If this is the case, a perfect foresight equilibrium must be efficient.14 Otherwise the rent per period would grow at a rate exceeding the rate of interest and its market fundamental would be infinite. Hence the existence of such an asset would automatically put the economy in the efficient range and thus prevent bubbles. 15 As it is hard to rule out on a priori grounds that aggregate rents per period do not become small relative to the economy, I now argue that, because rents are created over time, bubbles are not necessarily inconsistent with rents per period growing as fast as the economy. 13 Wallace justifies holding several assets by appealing to the need for diversification in a risky world. This justification is not necessary. The moral of our model of rent creation is that one can build economies in which rents per period do not become small relative to the economy and there is still scopefor bubbles. In our model the absence of ex-ante capitalization is crucial to this conclusion: At any moment of time most rents still remain to be created and thus do not necessarily crowd out current bubbles fully.
INSTITUTIONAL BACKING OF AN ASSET
The idea of backing an asset has recently been formalized in the monetary literature. It is now well-known that when money is the only asset and has no transaction value there in general exists a continuum of inefficient equilibria, in which the economy is asymptotically nonmonetary.
Wallace [38] and Millan [28] have looked at whether government intervention may prevent this kind of equilibrium. In Wallace the government stands ready to buy any amount of money if the price of money in terms of real good falls below some floor level. Thus under perfect foresight consumers know that the price of money won't fall to zero and thus select an asymptotically monetary equilibrium. Millan requires that consumers hold at each instant (at least) a fixed fraction of their total assets in money. They are indemnified for any loss on their money reserves relative to the market interest rate. To operate these transfers the government levies a lump-sum tax on the young generation. Again the value of money cannot converge to zero since otherwise the consumers would not be able to meet the reserve requirement. In both papers government intervention ensures efficiency.
Wallace's scheme cannot readily be applied to our economy. Even if the economy eventually becomes bubbleless, the real value of the aggregate bubble grows over time if the interest rate is positive. Thus a more sophisticated scheme than a single floor price would be required to ensure efficiency. Millan's scheme however can readily be applied to our framework. Our approach differs from Millan's in that consumers are not compensated for a loss in interest due to the reserve requirement. Lastly we require that reserve requirements be met:
gt ? 6s(wt, Ft+l).
Notice that there is a complementarity slackness relationship between equations (24) and (26): For the consumer to hold more gold than necessary (inequality in (26)), gold must bear the same interest rate as capital (equality in (24)). And conversely if Ft+, < rt+l (inequality in (24)), then gt = 6s(wt, Ft+,). Note that the dynamics of the economy are given by a system of multivalued difference equations. Therefore uniqueness of an equilibrium path is uncertain.
on money similarly operates a selection in the set of equilibria. 19 As our only goal is to illustrate the working of a class of models, no attempt is made at giving a realistic description of a banking system.
As a matter of fact we will be concerned with approximate uniqueness: Is there a reference path such that any equilibrium path is "close to" this path?
To simplify the study we shall assume throughout this section that the consumer's utility function is Cobb-Douglas: (27) u(cY, co) =,3 log cy+(I -,3) log co.
This assumption implies that savings depend only on the current wage, which simplifies the derivations considerably. I conjecture that the properties derived below hold for more general utility functions. First we consider existence and long-run behavior of an equilibrium path. Let b be defined, as in Section 3 (equation (16) Notice that dr*/ d6 > O. We can now state Proposition 4 (in Proposition 4, we do not as usual consider the borderline case 6 = 6 for brevity. The proof of this proposition, as well as those of Propositions 5 and 6 can be found in Tirole [35] . PROPOSITION 
(Asymptotic Uniqueness):
Assume that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas. For any 6 less than one there exists an equilibrium of the economy with reserve requirement.
(a) If6 < 6, the equilibrium interest rate converges to n (golden rule). In the long run there is no crash on gold. Bubbles on assets other than gold can exist. The asymptotic aggfregate bubble per capita is b.
(b) If 6 > 6, the equilibrium interest rate converges to r*(6) > n. In the long run there is a crash on gold in each period. Bubbles on unbacked assets do not exist. The asymptotic bubble per capita on gold is 6P(r*(6))(1 -,3). Proposition 4 shows that even if the equilibrium need not be unique, its long-run properties are uniquely defined. They depend crucially on whether the bubble in the bubbly steady state of the unbacked economy meets the reserve requirement. If it does, the economy behaves in the long run as in the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium of the unbacked economy. If it doesn't, then the long-run interest rate exceeds its golden rule level and a perpetual crash prevents the bubble on gold from overinflating. And the high interest rates rule out bubbles on unbacked assets. Now we consider small reserve requirements and we show that the whole equilibrium path, and not only its long-run behavior, is unique in an approximate sense. Let b, be the bubble per capita on an equilibrium path. Let b, denote the bubble per capita in the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium of the unbacked economy (see Section 3; b, converges to b). PROPOSITION Similar uniform bounds can be derivedfor wages, capital levels, and interest rates.
A corollary of Proposition 5 is that if the backed asset is the only bubble in the economy, the equilibrium path is unique and is the asymptotically bubbly path (the reserve requirement can never be binding as bt -(1 -a (6))bt > (/-(6))? A _( St). Proposition 5 implies that an arbitrarily small reserve requirement leads to the asymptotically bubbly path of the unbacked economy. In particular the asymptotically bubbleless equilibria described in Sections 3 and 4 are not robust to small reserve requirements whereas the asymptotically bubbly one is.
Lastly we study the efficiency properties of the equilibria with reserve requirements. As Proposition 5 shows, the existence of a reserve requirement in a sense solves the long run efficiency problem by ruling out asymptotically bubbleless paths in the inefficient case. However it creates a short run inefficiency by introducing a wedge between marginal rates of transformation and substitution when the constraint is binding. 20 So does the bubble on stocks. Note that this stochastic process can be created by elements irrelevant to the economy, i.e., sunspots. 22 Consumers are perfectly insured by holding the representative portfolio. Therefore the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium described in Section 3 is still an equilibrium of the economy with "bubble substitution," i.e., an economy in which there is a random transfer of a bubble from one asset to the other. Now this equilibrium has some interesting properties: Interest rates are deterministic and so is the market fundamental of stocks. However the bubble on stocks and therefore the price of stocks can fluctuate wildly.23 Thus the variance bound mentioned above is reversed. Also the asset prices are negatively correlated.
This remark of course matters for the tests of fluctuations of stock prices. That the Schiller-Leroy-Porter variance bounds can be violated in the presence of 21 Note that this martingale must satisfy some constraint: The bubble on gold must not exceed the aggregate bubble (and possibly must satisfy the reserve requirement if any). 22 Our other conclusion, the negative correlation over the whole set of asset prices, is worth studying both from a theoretical and from an empirical point of view. It implies that, in an economy without aggregate uncertainty, any set of assets is negatively correlated with the complementary set in the consumers' portfolio. The empirical tests will be hard to conduct, because, for a number of assets, one is missing data on quantities (gold, jewels, etc.), or prices (paintings, . . .) or both.
Note that the hypothesis of overall negative correlation is at variance with the Grossman-Shiller explanation of fluctuations in stock prices: If the latter are to be explained by fluctuating rates of interest, all asset prices ought to be positively correlated (which is not the case). Theories of stochastic aggregate bubble (see Azariadis [1] , Azariadis-Guesnerie [2] , and Weil [39] ) also lead to the opposite conclusion. Reality may indeed reflect the two forces, and only empirical investigations will be able to determine the degree of correlation of asset prices. 24 A second force that may pull the stock prices closer to these market fundamentals is the scarcity requirement (see Section 9). Assume that, because of lack of "focal stocks," the bubble must affect the whole stock market. If there is such a bubble, there is a tremendous incentive to create new firms, i.e., sell a bubble as well as a market fundamental. This would violate the scarcity condition.
What about existing firms? Can a firm the stock price of which contains a bubble make money by issuing new shares? This question is hard to answer. As we have shown earlier individual bubbles are certainly not uniquely defined by economic parameters. It is then likely that perfect foresight equilibria-or rational expectations equilibria in a more sophisticated model-must be associated with (focal) rules that consumers follow. If one of these rules says that the stock price of a firm must decrease in proportion of the number of shares issued, then in our set-up there is no scope for profit for the firm by issuing new shares (note that this rule holds in a bubbleless economy). Such a rule may support a bubble by decreasing the incentive to expend the asset.
THE MARKET FUNDAMENTAL OF MONEY AND TESTS OF MONETARY BUBBLES
In this section I consider monetary models in the light of the distinction between market fundamental and price bubble. Assume that money is held for transaction purposes. To simplify, the utility of a consumer born at time t depends on consumption when young and old and on real money held when young: u(cy, co, p,MY), where Pt is the price of money in terms of good and MY is the amount of money held when young. This clearly is not a satisfactory model of transaction demand, but it will suffice to illustrate our purpose. The consumer maximizes his utility subject to the constraints cy = Wt -ptMy -h and co = (1 + r,+1 )h + pt+ MY, where wt and h denote his first period wage and nonmonetary savings (the latter being a choice variable). From the first order conditions, the price of money in terms of good can be decomposed into two terms: ( ... 
29)
Pt
Thus et is a bubble. The market fundamental of one unit of money is the first term on the right-hand side of (29)
. u ,W/ut+ is the marginal rate of substitution between money and consumption when young. Thus {p,+,u +/ uV} is the marginal utility of one unit of money at time (t + r). We thus check that the market fundamental is equal to the present discounted value of the "dividends" distributed by the asset.
Equation ( Flood and Garber [16] give the first tests of asset bubbles in a monetary context (the 1922-23 German hyperinflation). To this purpose they use a model of money demand a la Cagan. As is usually done for other assets, they iterate the Cagan first-order difference equation to decompose solutions in a forward solution, that they call market fundamental, and nonstationary solutions, that they call bubbles. Their approach raises several theoretical problems. The ad-hoc demand function for money is not an innocent assumption. It implies that the "market fundamental" of money can be obtained by simply knowing the rates of growth of money (as well as the expected shocks to the money demand equation). Thus their market fundamental is unique without any institutional restriction. What (29) shows on the contrary is that the market fundamental of money in general depends on the whole path of prices (to this extent money is a very special asset). A more basic criticism to their approach is that, to be able to identify the market fundamental, one must collect information about expected prices and then compute the real value of money in each period. The latter can only be obtained by using a satisfactory model of transaction demand, which we do not possess. A corollary is that monetary bubbles are hard to identify. And indeed the Flood-Garber nonstationary solutions are not bubbles in the financial acceptance of the term. They do not grow at the rate of interest.
In view of the difficulties involved in empirically estimating money bubbles, it may be worth pursuing the theoretical foundations of such bubbles. The following proposition is such an attempt. Let us first make the following assumption: The following conclusion emerges from the analysis: There are two ways of giving value to money, and these are inconsistent, while they are not for other assets:
(i) The "fundamentalist view": Money is held to finance transactions (or to pay taxes or to satisfy a reserve requirement). To this purpose, money must, of course, be a store of value. However, it is not held for speculative purposes as there is no bubble on money.
(ii) The "bubbly view": Money is a pure store of value 'a la Samuelson. It does not serve any transaction purpose at least in the long run.27 This view implies (in the long run) that the price of money (bubble) grows at the real rate of interest, and that money is held entirely for speculation.
Preliminary analysis of the fundamentalist and the bubbly views show that they have a number of features in common. First both allow a multiplicity of equilibria. Second a number of equilibria can be ruled out by institutional constraints (reserve requirements, money-financed taxes, etc.) or (less primitive) assumptions about how money is essential for transactions. Because of these similarities and because the traditional notion of market fundamental is here somewhat blurred by the influence of the market price on the dividend, one may be tempted to treat the distinction between these two inconsistent views as being purely semantic.
However the two views differ in many of their implications. First, only the fundamentalist view can explain the rate of return dominance of money by other assets. Second only this view seems to be consistent with money keeping some value under intensive creation (see footnote 31). Third the fundamentalist view can also account for inflations while the bubbly view cannot if the real rate of return is nonnegative. Fourth the two views imply different degrees of substitution of money with other assets in the consumers' portfolios (see Section 5 for a start on this idea). Fifth, for modelling purposes, the fundamentalist view does not require overlapping generations while the bubbly view does.
POTENTIAL INEFFICIENCIES OF PRICE BUBBLES
Until now we have drawn a favorable picture of price bubbles. They help transfer goods from the young, generation to the old and to that extent are the private counterpart to national debt a la Diamond.28 Indeed when the bubbleless equilibrium is inefficient, the asymptotically bubbly equilibrium allows the economy to reach efficiency. Here we qualify this somewhat rosy picture by considering two kinds of inefficiency potentially associated with price bubbles. One type of inefficiency has to do with the cost of creating a bubbly asset. The other is the problem of the nonexhaustion of the market fundamental of a bubbly asset.
(a) Costly bubble creation. Imagine that there is a bubble on an asset which is intrinsically useless, say. Then it may pay to create new units of the asset, even if creation is costly (one can for instance envision the asset as being mined ore). This creation however does not create any real wealth in the economy, which suggests that the equilibrium is inefficient. In Tirole [35] it is shown that such an equilibrium path not only is inefficient, but also is Pareto dominated by some other perfect foresight equilibrium path in which creation of this asset is prohibited. The idea is that the agents who created the asset might as well save the creation costs, and issue pieces of paper with the same speculative value.
(b) Nonexhaustion of a market fundamentaL Consider the basic model described in Section 2 and assume that asset bubbles can exist. The produced good is called a schmoo. It is well-known that produced schmoos are white. However, by a fluke, firms at date zero produce a few black schmoos. Everyone agrees that this productive miracle will never occur again. Also it turns out that black and white schmoos are perfect substitutes in the consumers' utility function, and that moreover black schmoos are costlessly storable. At date zero everyone thinks that due to their scarcity the black schmoos should be priced above the white schmoos. The excess of their price to one is low enough so that a perfect foresight equilibrium prevails. In such an equilibrium the black schmoos are never consumed if interest rates are positive because their price in terms of white schmoos always exceeds one.
It is clear that such an equilibrium is infficient. Imagine that the old generation at date zero issues pieces of paper with the same value as that of black schmoos, and consumes the black schmoos. The rest of the path is unchanged and the old generation is better off. This phenomenon is nothing but the well-known problem of potential inefficiency of private extraction of a nonrenewable resource (see, e.g., Dasgupta-Heal [14, Ch. 8]). In this alternative formulation oil (our black schmoos) is not exhausted in the long run because the owners of oil fields are concerned with future capital gains (bubbles on black schmoos). Section 3 gives the conditions under which this kind of phenomenon can arise.
IS THE DISTINCTION
MARKET FUNDAMENTAL/BUBBLE SATISFACTORY?
At the beginning of the paper, we adopted the financial definition of the bubble on an asset as being the difference between its price and the present discounted value of its dividends. And we said that, from the arbitrage condition, the bubble grows at the rate of interest. It turns out that, in some cases, the usual notion of market fundamental and bubble is not fully satisfactory (although these magnitudes can still be defined). There are two reasons why it may be so. The first is related to an illusion in bubble accounting, and can easily be remedied. The second is potentially more damaging for the dichotomy and shows that a more subtle analysis is required in some cases.
(a) A pitfall in bubble accounting: Assume that there exists a partially unmined natural resource in limited supply. Extracted ore is completely useless, i.e., its market fundamental is zero. Consumers invest in extracted ore and in stocks of the mines (among other assets). Thus there is a bubble on extracted ore. The market fundamental associated with the ownership of mines is the present discounted value of dividends, i.e., of ore that will be extracted and sold on the extracted ore market. This market fundamental is in general strictly positive.
A simple and instructive result is that, if there are no extraction costs, the sum of the current value of extracted ore and the value of stocks of the mines grows at the real rate of interest, i.e., is a bubble.29 What happens is that the so-called market fundamental associated with the ownership of mines is a bubble itself as it feeds off another bubble, that on extracted ore. The moral is that, to obtain the aggregate bubble, one must add "direct" and "indirect" bubbles.
(b) Backing of an asset and thefinancial dichotomy: (i) Let us first consider the case of a storable good for which the exhaustion of the market fundamental requires the destruction of the good. This is for instance the case of gold. As an approximation, gold can at each period either be consumed or be held as a store of value, but not both, contrary to paintings, stocks, money, or land, for example. The problem caused by this feature is best exemplified using the metaphor of the black schmoos developed in Section 7. At each period the dividend associated with a black schmoo is zero; so is the market fundamental. However since the notion of market fundamental is implicitly linked with the "real value" of this asset, few people would say that the market fundamental of a black schmoo is 29 Let x, denote the quantity extracted at time t; X, the total amount extracted by time t; V, the total value on the extracted ore market; and W, the value of stocks. zero. They would rather assume it to be one, which is its consumption value. We are thus led to distinguish between the financial market fundamental (i.e., as seen by investors) (zero) and the real marketfundamental (one). By taking the differences between the market price and these market fundamentals, one obtains the financial bubble and the real bubble. Properly speaking the real bubble is not a bubble, because it does not grow at the rate of interest. It rather is a measure of the overestimation of the asset relative to its real value. One should keep in mind that the (only) connection between the market price and the real market fundamental is that at each instant, the latter imposes a lower bound on the former.
(ii) Next I would like to mention the case of a firm that does not distribute dividends. This case is somewhat similar to the previous one. The financial market fundamental of the stock (equal to the present discounted value of dividends) is lower than the real market fundamental, which is equal to the present discounted value of profits minus the level of the current debt. And, as earlier, the real market fundamental serves as a lower bound on the market price.30 It must therefore be the case that the stock of a firm that does not distribute dividends supports a financial bubble. This bubble again is unuiual in that it is partially backed by the real market fundamental (or its excess over the present discounted value of dividends if the firm distributes some).
(iii) As a third example consider the economy described in Section 4, and assume that the reserve requirement on the backed intrinsically useless asset is small and non-binding along the equilibrium path (bt > (s,). The asset's market price grows at the rate of interest. Thus the asset is a pure bubble according to the financial definition. However if the asset's price were low, the consumers would not be able to meet the reserve requirement. In this sense the asset has a real value.
We thus conclude that the financial market fundamental may not be the right lower bound on an asset's market price. If the price were to decrease towards its financial market fundamental, the asset would be used for other purposes niot yet included in the definition of the market fundamental: In (i), gold or black schmoos would be consumed; in (ii), the firm would be bought and possibly dividends would be paid; in (iii), the asset would be used to meet reserve requirements. We thus must take a flexible view of the market fundamental by distinguishing between the financial one (associated with arbitrage on the equilibrium path) and a "real one." A final caveat: There is sometimes ambiguity about the definition of the real market fundamental itself! Consider case (i) and assume that gold is essential and is used for consumption purposes (dentistry, for example). As we said the financial market fundamental of gold is zero. The real market fundamental can be defined as the current value of the stock of gold that is used for consumption. However this quantity, as well as the price, are endogeneous. One possibility is to take the value along the equilibrium path. Another possibility is to compute the total value of gold in a fictitious economy in which bubbles on gold are ruled out (and therefore the whole stock of gold is consumed). These two values in general differ (see Tirole [35] for a comparison).
WHAT CREATES A BUBBLE?
In a sense I have been considering the demand for bubbles. The supply is virtually unlimited. For example I am always willing to pretend that a drawing I made when I was young is worth $1000, say. However I doubt I will be successful in convincing others that they should invest in it. If I were famous, I might be able to do so. Since almost anything is a potential source of bubble, how are actual bubbles, if any, selected?
There are three conditions that are necessary to creat a bubble: Durability, scarcity, and common beliefs. The common agreement requirement comes from the need for a focal point in the set of potential bubbles. The scarcity requirement stems from the fact that new units must have the same price as the old ones. The possibility of creating too much of this asset may prevent bubbles on this asset (see Wallace [38] and Tirole [35] ). 31 The scarcity requirement explains why, at first sight, bubbles often affect assets that for historical reasons cannot be reproduced.32
CONCLUSION
To conclude I believe that the investigation of overlapping generations models should somewhat shift emphasis from the study of money to that of assets that are held for more speculative purposes. It is clear that the models and the empirical evidence are too preliminary to settle the question of whether we should expect to observe asset bubbles in overlapping generations economies. And we have not solved the old debate about which one of overlapping generations and infinitely lived consumers (or overlapping generations with bequests) is the "right" model. The difference between the two formalizations is substantial since bubbles may exist in the former but not in the latter. But I hope to have convinced the reader that in our current state of knowledge we would be best advised to believe that bubbles are not inconsistent with optimizing behavior and general equilibrium. 31 It can be shown that the maximum rate of growth of an asset consistent with a bubble on this asset is the difference between the asymptotic rate of growth of the economy and the asymptotic rate of interest in the Diamond bubbleless economy. The possibility of future creation is indeed one of the reasons why Tobin [37] is somewhat sceptical about the use of overlapping generations models of money without transaction motives ("There is no governmental commitment to the value of money," p. 85).
32 Potential examples are rare stamps, letters of past famous writers or personalities, famous paintings, gold, diamonds, land. For instance the market fundamental-consumption value-of rare stamps seems to be low-all the more that they generally sit in a bank; but their price can be very high. Artificial and real diamonds cannot be told apart with the naked eye. If there is no snobism effect, their market fundamental is basically the same, in spite of the fact that they command very different prices. If the real value of the asset depends on its price, the analysis is not as clear-cut; it then resembles that for money with transaction motives. Second assume that there exists t such that r, < r,-. If r, < n, we know from Lemma 2 that the economy is asymptotically bubbleless and that r, converges to F. Hence assume that VT > 0, rt+ > n. The interest rate must then converge to n in order for the bubble per capita not to explode. And lim,.o0f, =0. As r,+1 = fr(r,, a,) and n = fr (P(n), b), a,, and thus b,, must converge to b. Q.E.D. If not, for some t, lim_,s {s(w', rr+) The path {Irt, wt, a',} satisfies (4), (7), (10), (11), (12), and (15), i.e., is an equilibrium. The proof is similar for the set of feasible ao (at' goes to +oo for some t).
Q.E.D.
Let us now conclude the proof. First assume that 0 < F < n. Lemma 1 tells us that there exists an do that leads to a bubbleless equilibrium. Lemmas 6 and 7 ensure that the equilibrium set is convex, has a nonempty interior, and is bounded below by do. Let ado denote the supremum in this set (60 < wo). From Lemma 10, ado leads to an equilibrium. From Lemmas 3, 5, and 9, for ao E [do, ado) (ao= aO), the interest rate converges to F(n); and ao0 [do, ado] is not an equilibrium:
The functionsfo(ao) and bo(ao) are represented in Figure 3 (ao0[0o, ao)>rt-* F; aO= ao=>rtr-n). Next assume that F <0. From Lemma 3, for a given ao, the interest rate converges to r or to n or the path is not feasible. If the interest rate converges to F, the market fundamental fo(ao) is infinite and ao is not an equilibrium. Lemma 9 and 10 show that there exists ado such that the corresponding path is feasible and the interest rate converges to n. The last step consists in checking that this path is an equilibrium path, i.e., that bo(do) ? 0. Imagine that bo(ado) < 0. Then the bubble is always negative. As the interest rate converges to n, Ft converges to (RIn) and ft converges to 0. Thus at becomes arbitrarily small, or negative, and the interest rate cannot converge to n from (8).
Q.E.D.
The last two lemmas check that, in the asymptotically bubbly path, nonproductive savings increase with the current level of capital; and that, if there are no rents, convergence to the golden rule is monotonic. 
